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In 1981 the medical essayist Lewis Thomas labelled dementia “The disease of the century”.​[1]​ Nearly 30 years on, the incidence of dementia and dementia-like conditions across western societies has continued to increase: according to the estimates of the Alzheimer’s society, about 25% of the population of the UK can expect to suffer some significant degree of dementia during the course of their life.​[2]​ In addition to the obvious practical and moral issues dementia raises, change on such a scale has the capacity to re-shape our shared experience, deep assumptions about ‘the way life is’. For Christians, it raises further questions: when the person seems to disappear, what space is left for faith? Where is God in the spectacle of fine, beautiful, loving, faithful Christians reduced to such a state?

‘Dementia’ here refers to a category of our experience rather than of medical science: the experience of a loved one suffering. Medically, it may be ascribable to Alzheimer’s, to physical injury, stroke or a range of other causes: but those who are close to the person with dementia tend to speak more of a sort of bereavement, of the sense of a person slipping away. The person may seem to crumble or to change beyond recognition; maintaining a sense of the person within the condition requires struggle, questioning and constant adaptation to change.​[3]​ For this is a condition that seems to bring the very integrity of humanity into question: it is “deconstruction incarnate”​[4]​

Such a situation, in which the fragility and contingency of our human createdness is most nakedly exposed, is rich in theological challenge and potential. Nevertheless, theological reflections are surprisingly thin on the ground and tend not to refer to each other. The purpose of this paper is to draw together the main theological approaches that have emerged in the last twenty years to begin to answer the question: what sort of a God may be found in dementia? 

Three lines of thought address these questions, which belong together though for clarity’s sake I will discuss them separately. First and understandably, the majority of the available theology starts from the pastoral dilemmas: What words of assurance can be given to one whose memory and personality seem to be failing? What is the Christian hope for somebody experiencing the grip of a terminal progressive disease?  Following on from these immediate questions are those theological ones raised by the ‘eclipse’ of an individual personality, and the experience that the identity of each person is ‘held’ by all the others. These centre on the nature of relationality, of belonging-together, in God and in the Church. Finally, in recognising the person with dementia as in imago dei, questions arise about the type of God who is to be found in a world in which people dement. What sort of God do we worship, if the dementing person is God’s image, if the community of those who struggle with dementia is God’s body? 


1.	Re-membering the forgetful: theological responses to the pastoral challenges of dementia

We are left with the question, When confronted by issues like dementia can we discover vision, hope and words of transformation and transfiguration, or do we stand silent, unable to comprehend the scale and scope of the problem and the pain, and with nothing positive to offer?​[5]​

Inevitably and appropriately, pastoral theology has tended to provide the departure-point for reflections on dementia. If the good news is to be proclaimed to those who are dementing and those who care for them, vague gestures of concern will not do. In response to his own questions, Oliver Goldsmith examines four possible models:

1. A 'Traditional/historical model', in which memory is central as placing us in a shared tradition, and which therefore progressively excludes those whose memory is vanishing

2. An 'Open to God' model, which envisages each individual as being moved by the Spirit into an ever-richer enjoyment of God's fellowship, but which runs counter to the experience of those who are dementing.

3. A 'Growth' model, which envisages the individual as continuously journeying toward full spiritual maturity: again, this seems counter to the experienced decline and diminishment attendant on dementia.

4. A 'Remembered by God' model, which he takes to be "[t]he only theological model which seems to encapsulate the 'Good News' for the person with dementia", stressing that “we are remembered by God long before and long after we make any recognizable response to God. We are unconditionally accepted by God, and we are unconditionally acceptable to God.”​[6]​

The attractions of this model are clear, and some version of it underlies the majority of pastoral theology developed in response to dementia. It gives a simple and clear message of hope and comfort, both for the individual sufferer and for those close to them which does not depend up on any doctrinal belief or subtlety beyond the vaguely theistic sense of a present, caring God. 

This simplicity may be the reason why the slogan 'God Never Forgets' seems to crop up repeatedly in the literature.​[7]​ Nevertheless, the model has its limitations both as a theological and a pastoral strategy. In the first place, there is a tendency to denial of the depth of the questions raised (since although the person forgets, God always remembers) and a profound pessimism (in which dementia is understood only as loss and as a step towards death). There is no continuing ’presence’ of God in dementia, but only the eschatological and somewhat vague hope that God will make everything all right in the end. Amidst the abandonments and bereavements of dementia, the person is abandoned by and bereaved of the Living God.

These limitations stand out particularly starkly in David Keck's work, Forgetting Whose We Are: Alzheimer's Disease and the Love of God, since this represents by far the most developed and extensive theological exploration of dementia currently in print. It is a rich book, arising out of his experience of his own mother's dementia, reflected on from a broadly postliberal perspective underpinned by a Barthian theology of the Word. Thus, it treats God's sovereignty as 'non-negotiable', focuses on the Cross and takes what it understands to be the traditional body of church doctrine as a given.​[8]​

Although Keck speaks of the suffering Christ, it is as an offering of human suffering to God and not a revelation of a com-passionate God. Christ offers us an 'Alzheimer's hermeneutic' in which the displacement of self entailed in caring for someone with Alzheimer's prepares one for the same displacement of self in listening for the Word of God. ​[9]​ Keck's God is a loving and responsive one, waiting for our openness to the Spirit, but in the final analysis uncompromisingly impassible and sovereign, outside of and above the situation, not within it. 

We may conclude, therefore, that the proclamation of a God who always remembers, however comforting, comes at too high a theological cost: it leaves us alone in our struggle with the terrifying contingency and flux of dementia, maintaining hope only in a God who will somehow be there at the end of it all. It places God on the 'outside' of the process of change and deterioration, uninvolved in the messy business of living and dying in dementia; waiting at the door, as it were, for it all to be over and the victim to be released into death. 

What seems to be missing from these accounts is a 'strong' doctrine of the Imago Dei, which would have two implications. The first is that, if we are all in God's image, then the world is not divisible into carers and patients in any stable way: the dividing line between these constituencies runs through each of us. The second implication is that the resemblance between God and humanity is not a chance similarity, considered useful as a source of sermon aids and poetic imagery; but a solidarity (albeit an interrupted one) between Creator and created. We learn the truth of our experience by reflection upon God; and we learn the truth of God by reflection on our experience.
 




"Conscious, collaborative authorship of the self-narrative"; God for us, and us for each other.

One of the key resources which recent Christian theology has deployed to talk of 'relationships' – God's with us and ours with each other – has been the notion of a 'social trinity' of three persons in perfect unity. Setting aside questions of the theological propriety of treating the Godhead as a prototypical community, there are some clear practical benefits to such a move: questions to do with how Christians (and others) live together can be addressed by reference to the relations in the Godhead, thus becoming 'theological' in a full and rich sense.

This approach converges rather neatly with recent secular thinking on dementia. Care for those with dementia has been radically rethought as a result of the work of Tom Kitwood, who persuasively argued that the term 'dementia' is descriptive not simply of a neurological condition affecting an individual, but of the whole network of social relationships in which they are embedded.​[10]​ ‘Dementia’ occurs in the interaction between person and society: societies may heal and re-member failing individuals, or may demonstrate that they too are 'dementing', displaying what Kitwood terms a 'malignant social psychology' that makes matters considerably worse.

Theologically, the question then arises whether (and how) the Church may be understood as a healing or dementing community; and specifically, about how the community may share responsibility for memory.  Thus, for Stephen Sapp. memory is not only the responsibility of the individual (whose memory is failing) and God (whose memory is transcendent); there is also a role for the community, who can remember on behalf of the individual and in the name of God. As Israel preserved the corporate memory of God's acts in history, and the Church regularly obeys the commandment to "Do this in remembrance of me", the identity of the person-in-community is maintained even as their memory-formed individual identity suffers impairment.  From here it is a short step to the notion of trinity-as-community: the Trinity holds the persons of the Godhead and indeed the identity of all of us in a communal embrace.

Thus the theme of the 'social trinity' whose being is described as being-in-relationship can be used to draw an analogy to the Church as the place where 'identity' is held corporately and collaboratively. This was a recurrent theme in a recent collection of papers, which questioned the dominant paradigm of a human being as an independent self-defining monad in the name of those whose humanity, because of their dementia, must be understood differently.​[11]​

Not only does this approach support current thinking in dementia care, but it brings something new and important to it. As has been noted by several writers, Kitwood's account of the person, taken on its own, is non-realist and strangely ungrounded. There is a danger that, when 'collaborative authorship of the self-narrative' moves from the individual to the community, the person disappears in a fanciful construction.​[12]​ The suggestion needs a community 'before God', grounded in and derived from a transcendent truth not of its own inventing. The doctrine of the Trinity can supply such a transcendent grounding. Thus, for example, John Swinton (drawing on Zizioulas and Volf) stresses that

. . . the inherently relational nature of human beings emerges from the nature and relational shape of the God in whose image they are created; a Trinitarian God who is himself constituted by relationships . . . Within such a conception of God, the creation of humanity is understood as the product of the overspill of this divine perichoretic love. Thus it can be seen that human beings are created from and in loving relationships, for loving relationships.​[13]​

It is this ‘ontological grounding’ of individual identity in the Trinity that frees us to take our attention away from questions of an individual's capacities and attend to the community in which their humanity is embedded.​[14]​

In a related discussion, Rosalie Hudson concludes that 

Perhaps the person with dementia - freed from all pretension, totally incapable of spiritual self-examination - might be an icon of God's grace to us? . . . In the divine dance of Trinitarian love we are welcomed as partners: we are drawn into the fellowship of the Father, Son and Spirit, even when we have forgotten the steps . . . [Dementia] reminds us of our own frailty." ​[15]​


Although these lines of thought seem tantalisingly rich in potential, arguments from the 'social trinity' to the structure of human societies by a process of analogy neglect the fact that the 'social trinity' has already been derived analogically: we project our ideals of human society into heaven as the 'social life of the trinity', and then argue from that life back to human society.​[16]​ To put it another way, we construct our societies imago dei because we have already constructed our Trinity imago hominorum. Thus it is no surprise that Swinton finds in the Trinity an image of the ideals that he (after Kitwood) espouses; nor is it surprising that Hudson's hospitable God mirrors her ideal of the hospitable community.

To say this is not to dismiss such constructions altogether, but indicates the need for more self-awareness. If we are to use analogy in this 'strong' sense, to say things about God and humanity that are more than merely illustrative, then we need to pay attention to the steps involved. First of all, we need to recognise that the only safe way to analogise from imago dei to God in Godself is via the one who is named as 'the image of the invisible God', Jesus Christ. 


The Image of the Invisible God:  finding the Christ of dementia

Although there is a danger that it be used wrongly, the theology of the social trinity has usefully emphasised the 'shared' nature of divinity: that God’s being is not to be separated from God’s relationships. To place these thoughts in a Christological framework we turn once again  to Swinton , this time drawing upon Bonhoeffer’s Christology:

If we are to understand Christ we must understand the relationship of Christ to human beings: the very being of Christ is his being-for-humanity. More, it is impossible to reflect on Christ-in-Christ’s self without reflecting on his relationships to humanity. In Christ God creates a space within God’s self for human beings; God opens up God’s very being to incorporate human beings . . . This relatedness is not theoretical; nor does it relate only to the historical Jesus. Christ’s relatedness to human beings is active and contemporary. God is pro me in the present as well as in the past.​[17]​

God is not detached, because God is defined (in Christ) as pro me. This is the distinctive theological move that marks much of twentieth-century theology. It accepts that the contingency, change and openness to an uncertain future that marks humanity is not a shortcoming, a disruption of true humanity but is also in the image of God . It then concludes that God cannot be aloof from contingent human life,  but that in Christ God’s very self is implicated in the contingency of human existence.

Armed with this insight, it is now possible to see why Keck’s understanding of the work of Christ does not go far enough to enable us to identify Christ in dementia. He hastens to dismiss much of the work of twentieth-century theologians as ‘myopic’, the product of ‘short-term memories’ and of ‘luxury’​[18]​ with no lasting value. But in the process, he overlooks the reasons why such contextually-embedded, shifting and temporary theologies were and continue to be important: because in the twentieth century it seemed to many that the forces of evil were unleashed in such a monstrous way that ‘only the suffering God could help’.​[19]​ Similarly, in the face of the monstrosity of dementia, only the dementing God can help.

This may seem a shocking and worrying line of enquiry, but it only extends an established theme in recent contextual theologies: that the God who validates our existence must in some sense participate in it. For example, in his reflections on working with the mentally disabled, Stanley Hauerwas maintains that,”God’s face is the face of the retarded; God’s body is the body of the retarded; God’s being is that of the retarded.”​[20]​ In a similar vein, for Eiesland the resurrection appearances demonstrate God’s solidarity with the disabled:, for “In presenting his impaired hands and feet to his startled friends, the resurrected Jesus is revealed as the disabled God. “​[21]​ The conviction that drives both Hauerwas and Eiesland is that  the ‘image’ in the imago dei is to be taken with the utmost seriousness: to see the person is to see God, and to know God is to know the person. In a similar vein, we may say that God is subjected to dementia in solidarity with the dementing person. 

While I am confident that this conclusion follows naturally from the broad trajectory of western protestant theology in the last century, it has some rather startling implications. The image of God as all-seeing, all-knowing, all-remembering, all-understanding is ancient and deeply established: deeper, perhaps, even that the understanding of God’s unity or God’s power.  The history of the world’s salvation, we hold, was securely and perfectly foreknown and planned by God; nothing that we do or are will ever be lost from the memory of the all-knowing one. What space therefore might there be for a God who shares our forgetfulness, our frustration, our shifting and transient sense of self-identity?

One answer would be to accept that the God who dements cannot be a God who preserves us: with the Christian Atheists, to interpret the self-emptying of God to mean God is emptied even of divinity. A more constructive proposal is to return to the doctrine of the Trinity as a way of talking of the coinherence of omnipotence and powerlessness in the Godhead: of a place where these apparent opposites are reconciled in eternal perichoresis. 

So what sort of God is to be found in dementia? Not a new one, clearly, but the God of Christians, the God who is both human and divine, in a new way.  The next stage if thinking about the God who is present in dementia is not to dream up a radical new portrayal, or to take refuge in vaguely theistic affirmations of God's power, or to settle for the poetry of an imagined 'social trinity'. Only the context of dementia is new: the task is the old one, of 'thinking together' God's vulnerability and God's power.
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